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ABSTRACT
Being an emerging class of in-memory computing architecture,
brain-inspired hyperdimensional computing (HDC) mimics brain
cognition and leverages random hypervectors (i.e., vectors with a
dimensionality of thousands or evenmore) to represent features and
to perform classi￿cation tasks. The unique hypervector representa-
tion enables HDC classi￿ers to exhibit high energy e￿ciency, low
inference latency and strong robustness against hardware-induced
bit errors. Consequently, they have been increasingly recognized as
an appealing alternative to or even replacement of traditional deep
neural networks (DNNs) for local on-device classi￿cation, espe-
cially on low-power Internet of Things devices. Nonetheless, unlike
their DNN counterparts, state-of-the-art designs for HDC classi-
￿ers are mostly security-oblivious, casting doubt on their safety
and immunity to adversarial inputs. In this paper, we study for the
￿rst time adversarial attacks on HDC classi￿ers and highlight that
HDC classi￿ers can be vulnerable to even minimally-perturbed
adversarial samples. Concretely, using handwritten digit classi￿ca-
tion as an example, we construct a HDC classi￿er and formulate a
grey-box attack problem, where an attacker’s goal is to mislead the
target HDC classi￿er to produce erroneous prediction labels while
keeping the amount of added perturbation noise as little as possible.
Then, we propose a modi￿ed genetic algorithm to generate adver-
sarial samples within a reasonably small number of queries, and
further apply critical gene crossover and perturbation adjustment
to limit the amount of perturbation noise. Our results show that
adversarial images generated by our algorithm can successfully
mislead the HDC classi￿er to produce wrong prediction labels with
a high probability (i.e., 78% when the HDC classi￿er uses a ￿xed
majority rule for decision). Finally, we also present two defense
strategies — adversarial training and retraining — to strengthen the
security of HDC classi￿ers.
1 INTRODUCTION
With the exploding rise of the Internet of Things (IoT) and edge
computing, there comes an enormous amount of data that is being
continuously generated at countless devices all over the world [1].
Nonetheless, due to various constraints such as timing, privacy con-
cerns and lack of su￿cient bandwidth, moving all the data to central
clouds for processing is simply out of question. Consequently, the
need of on-device machine learning inference (e.g., running image
classi￿cation on smart cameras powered by deep neural networks
or DNNs) to extract actionable information from locally generated
data has been quickly surging [2, 3].
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To run complex DNNs for inference on resource-constrained de-
vices, numerous model compression and neural architecture search
(NAS) techniques have been proposed, thereby reducing the DNN
model size and inference latency [3–10]. Thanks to these e￿orts,
DNN inference on resource-constrained edge devices has become a
reality, with state-of-the-art compressed DNN models being able
to deliver near real-time image classi￿cation on modern mobile
devices [3, 6]. Despite these encouraging results, however, the room
left for further reducing the inference latency and energy consump-
tion is vanishing, which adds signi￿cant challenges to ubiquitously
￿t DNN models into a full spectrum of edge devices such as wear-
ables and low-cost IoT devices. This is due in part to the inherent
limitation of DNN model and architecture that require overly inten-
sive mathematical operation and computing beyond the capability
of many edge devices.
In very recent years, brain-inspired hyperdimensional computing
(HDC) has emerged as an ultra-lightweight classi￿cation framework
and architecture [11–14]. Speci￿cally, HDC exploits the key princi-
ple that human brain “computes” based on certain patterns formed
by a large number of neurons, without being directly associated
with numbers [13]. Thus, instead of computing with numbers like
in today’s DNNs, a HDC classi￿er mimics the way brain cognition
works by representing information/features using a hypervector
with binary elements in a very high-dimensional space (e.g., with a
dimensionality of ⇡ = 104 or more), where there are numerous hy-
pervectors that are almost certainly orthogonal to each other [12].
Through training based on simple operation such as superposition
and permutation (details in Section 2), a set of binary hypervectors
representing di￿erent prediction classes can be constructed and
stored in an associative memory. For testing/inference, a query
sample is also mapped to a hypervector, which is then compared
against pre-trained class hypervectors in the associative memory to
produce a prediction label based on a distance metric (e.g., typically
Hamming distance) [11, 13].
Unlike standard DNN-based classi￿ers that require non-linear
multi-layer perception, classi￿cation based on HDC is inherently
“in-memory” due to their binarized hypervectors and can be per-
formed using basic logical operations like XOR without the need
of sophisticated computation [13, 15]. As a result, compared to
DNN-based classi￿ers, HDC classi￿ers o￿er several key advan-
tages, including extremely high energy e￿ciency, low latency, and
strong robustness against hardware-induced component failures
[12, 13]. For example, recent studies have shown that the energy
consumption and inference latency of HDC classi￿ers are lower by
orders of magnitude than their DNN counterparts, yet achieving a
reasonable inference accuracy [14, 16–21]. Moreover, in HDC, bi-
nary elements are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
and not a single element carries more information than others in a
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hypervector with a large dimensionality. Therefore, a small number
of memory-induced random bit errors in the associative memory
can barely a￿ect the classi￿cation result, making HDC classi￿ers
less prone to hardware errors [13, 22]. Additionally, the training
process for HDC classi￿ers is also much simpler than for DNNs,
using only basic logic operators without complex optimization
techniques [12, 13, 15]. In Section 3, we will provide an example of
building a HDC classi￿er for handwritten digit classi￿cation.
Consequently, HDC classi￿ers have been increasingly recognized
as an alternative to or even replacement of DNNs for local on-
device classi￿cation, especially on low-power devices [12, 13, 15].
For example, the quickly expanding list of applications building
on HDC classi￿ers have already included language classi￿cation
[23], image classi￿cation [11, 24], emotion recognition based on
physiological Signals [25], distributed fault isolation in power plants
[26], gesture recognition for wearable devices [21], and seizure
onset detection and identi￿cation of ictogenic brain regions [27].
More recently, HDC-based learning has also been integrated with
visual perception modules of safety-critical robots for real-time
navigation [28].
Nonetheless, despite the aforementioned appealing advantages
compared to DNNs, the security aspect of emerging HDC classi￿ers
has not been clearly understood. It is well-known that traditional
DNNs can be highly vulnerable to adversarial samples that look
almost identical to correctly-classi￿ed benign samples by human
perception but are still misclassi￿ed, thereby driving a surging in-
terest in safeguarding DNNs against adversarial inputs [29–33]. By
contrast, the existing studies on HDC classi￿ers have been predom-
inantly focused on reducing energy consumption and latency or
further improving the HDC architecture [14, 16–21, 34], while the
security aspect remains untouched. This can raise serious concerns
with the safety of HDC classi￿ers and limit their wider adoption,
especially in mission-critical applications such as robot navigation
and health monitoring [27, 28].
Contribution. In this paper, we make a ￿rst-of-its-kind e￿ort
to investigate the potential vulnerability of emerging HDC clas-
si￿ers. We highlight that state-of-the-art designs of HDC classi-
￿ers [17, 18] are security oblivious and their robustness against
hardware-induced bit errors [11, 12, 22] does not imply robustness
against adversarial inputs. Using handwritten digit classi￿cation
as an example, we demonstrate that HDC classi￿ers su￿er from
vulnerability to minimally-perturbed adversarial samples. In Fig. 1,
we show an example of adversarial attacks. While the adversarial
image looks almost identical to the benign one with di￿erences in
only a few pixels, the HDC classi￿er is fooled and can only predict
the adversarial image as digit “2”.
More concretely, we build a HDC classi￿er for handwritten digit
classi￿cation based on theMNIST dataset [35], following thewidely-
used training approach in HDC [11, 12]. Then, we consider a threat
model in which an attacker can launch grey-box attacks by repeat-
edly sending perturbed images to the HDC classi￿er and receiving
the Hamming distance output as well as the prediction label from
the classi￿er. We formulate this problem as regularized optimiza-
tion, where the attacker’s goal is to mislead the target HDC classi￿er
to produce wrong prediction labels (i.e., non-targeted attack) while
keeping the amount of added perturbation noise as little as possible.
OriginaO
(a)
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Figure 1: An adversarial image generated by our modi￿ed
genetic algorithm GA-CGC-PA. (a) Original benign image of
digit “6”. (b) Added perturbation noise, whose value is re-
scaled to the maximum for better visualization and would
otherwise be nearly invisible. (c) Adversarial image that
looks almost identical to the benign image but is misclas-
si￿ed as “2”.
A key challenge for launching successful adversarial attacks
is that the attacker does not know how the target HDC classi￿er
represents features in a hyperdimensional space and instead only re-
ceives the Hamming distance output as well as the prediction label.
In addition, the way that the target HDC classi￿er maps inputs to
hypervectors is highly non-di￿erentiable and thus, gradient-based
approaches for grey-box attacks on standard DNNs do not apply
[33]. To address these challenges, we propose a modi￿ed genetic
algorithm, called Genetic Algorithm with Critical Gene Crossover
and Perturbation Adjustment (GA-CGC-PA). Speci￿cally,GA-CGC-
PA only modi￿es critical genes (i.e., selected important pixels that
are more relevant to classi￿cation) and iteratively searches for the
best candidate adversarial image. GA-CGC-PA also applies pertur-
bation adjustment to further reduce the amount of perturbation
noise added to the original benign image.
Our evaluation results demonstrate that, for the majority of be-
nign images under our test, the attacker can add a reasonably small
amount of perturbation noise (i.e., as few as 9 pixels) and create ad-
versarial images within a limited number of iterations, successfully
misleading the target HDC classi￿er to a wrong prediction label.
This presents a signi￿cant threat to HDC classi￿ers and requires
appropriate defense strategies. To strengthen the security of HDC
classi￿ers, we present two simple defense strategies to degrade
attack performance in terms of the attack success rate (ASR): one
based on the idea of adversarial training (i.e., including adversarial
samples into the training dataset) [15, 33], and the other one based
on the idea of retraining and ensemble learning [36].
In summary, we propose GA-CGC-PA to generate adversarial
images that look similar to the original benign ones by human per-
ception but are misclassi￿ed by HDC classi￿ers. We also discuss a
set of possible defense mechanisms to enhance the security of HDC
classi￿ers, making them more applicable in future safety-critical
applications. While our threat model and attacks share similarities
with conventional adversarial machine learning on DNNs [37, 38],
we use a Hamming distance-related objective function in Eqn. (2),
which is speci￿cally tailored to HDC classi￿ers. Most importantly,
the key novelty of our study is that it is the ￿rst to investigate the
potential vulnerability of emerging brain-inspired HDC classi￿ers.
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2 PRELIMINARIES ON HDC CLASSIFIERS
HDC classi￿ers have been found in an increasingly larger set of
applications, including image classi￿cation [11, 24], seizure onset
detection [27], fault isolation in power plants [26], robot naviga-
tion [28], among many others. An important property of HDC is
that each hypervector is a pseudorandom ⇡-dimensional vector
taken by default from { 1, 1}⇡ containing i.i.d. binary elements
that can be either 1 or  1 [11]. Then, HDC leverages distributed
holographic representation to project information onto a hyperdi-
mensional space. Given two hypervectors, Hamming distance is
commonly used as a distance metric to measure their similarity.
Formally, Hamming distance is de￿ned as the number of distinct
binary elements between two hypervectors. If there exist ⇡/2 dif-
ferent elements, then the inner product of two hypervectors is zero
and the two hypervectors are considered orthogonal. For the con-
venience of presentation, Hamming distance is often normalized
with respect to the dimensionality ⇡ in HDC. Thus, two orthogonal
hypervectors have a (normalized) Hamming distance of 0.5.
2.1 Random Indexing
A HDC classi￿er projects data onto a hyperdimensional space via
random indexing. Speci￿cally, a random hypervector in { 1, 1}⇡
has an almost equal number of randomly placed -1 and 1. The
almost-certain orthogonality due to the large dimensionality of
⇡ demonstrates that any two randomly chosen hypervectors are
orthogonal or quasi-orthogonal with an extremely high likelihood
[11–13]. In a hyperdimensional space, there are enormous hyper-
vectors that are orthogonal to each other. Such uncorrelated hy-
pervectors can be used to represent various types of information
or features of an object, such as 26 letters in the alphabet set. The
hypervectors representing the basic features are called basis hyper-
vectors, which remain unchanged in an application once randomly
chosen. Moreover, through a set of well-de￿ned operators per-
formed over basis hypervectors, an object can then be encoded into
a new hypervector for further classi￿cation [13, 22, 39].
2.2 Multiply-Add-Permute Operation
The most widely-used HDC operation is Multiply-Add-Permute
(MAP), which speci￿es three fundamental operators: binding (mul-
tiplication), superposition (addition), and permutation.
Binding (Multiplication). Given two hypervectors  +1 and
 +2, binding operation performs element-wise multiplication, de-
noted as  +1 ⌦ +2. The operation is used to represent the associa-
tion of related hypervectors. The resulting hypervector of binding
is orthogonal to both of its constituents [13].
Superposition (Addition). Like element-wise multiplication in
binding operation, superposition of  +1, · · · , +" is an element-
wise addition of hypervectors denoted as  +1   · · ·    +" . Su-
perposition aims to generate a sum hypervector  + 0, which can
represent a set of operand hypervectors and aggregate information
conveyed by them. According to Hebbian Learning, after superposi-
tion, any of the constituents is more similar to + 0 than a randomly
generated hypervector [40, 41].
An element-wise majority rule (MR) is routinely adopted after
superposition, ensuring that the resulting hypervector still lies in
the hyperdimensional space { 1, 1}⇡ . Concretely, if the component
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Figure 2: Hamming distances. (a) The normalized Hamming
distance between each two di￿erent position hypervectors
is 0.5. (b) The normalized Hamming distance between each
pair of value hypervectors for 256 pixel values: The larger
the pixel value di￿erence, the larger the Hamming distance
between their corresponding value hypervectors.
value of the resultant after addition is positive (i.e., there are more
1s than  1s in superposition), it is converted to 1 and otherwise  1.
In the even that the component value of the resultant is zero, it is
randomly encoded to 1 or  1 with equal probabilities, which we
also refer to as the random majority rule (RMR) [42]. Alternatively,
we can also always assign 1 or  1 to the component value in such
cases, which we refer to as the ￿x majority rule (FMR).
Permutation. The permutation operation generates a dissimilar
hypervector by shu￿ing coordinates of the original hypervector in
a pseudo-random manner. A hypervector  + permuted = times is
denoted as d= ( + ). Permutation is used to store and di￿erentiate
the sequence of elements. For example, the letter sequence 012 can
be distinguished from 102 by permutation.
3 A HDC CLASSIFIER ON MNIST DATASET
In this section, we construct a HDC classi￿er on the MNIST dataset
[35] for handwritten digit recognition, which will be the target
application for describing our proposed adversarial attacks. Our
design builds on the widely-used approach to constructing HDC
classi￿ers [11, 18, 22]. Note that it is also an active research direction
in the ￿eld to design HDC classi￿ers for more complex image
classi￿cation tasks [11, 43].
In the MNIST dataset, each digit image has 28 ⇥ 28 pixels, with
integer pixel values in the range of [0, 255]. During the training
stage, the key goal of our HDC classi￿er is to project each of the
digit images in training dataset with labels to a hypervector (called
sample hypervector) and then construct a single hypervector for
each class (called class hypervector). The class hypervectors are then
stored in an associative memory for inference on testing images.
During the testing stage, an unknown test sample is also encoded to
a hypervector (called query hypervector), which is then compared
in parallel with all the trained class hypervectors in terms of the
Hamming distances. Finally, the classi￿er returns the label of the
class hypervector that has the shortest Hamming distance to the
query hypervector.
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Figure 3: (a) The encoder in our HDC classi￿er encodes a digital image (called sample image) to a sample hypervector. (b) The
overview of the HDC classi￿er. During the training stage, an associative memory storing class hypervectors is generated using
the training dataset. Then, a test sample can be classi￿ed based on its similarity to class hypervectors.
3.1 Mapping
In conventional machine learning, a handwritten digit image can be
fully represented by its pixel values together with the corresponding
pixel positions. In HDC, an image needs to be represented using
hypervectors instead. Thus, we need to ￿rst map the information
of pixel positions as well as the pixel values into a set of basis
hypervectors, which will later be encoded into a single hypervector
for image representation in a hyperdimensional space.
In order to convert an image’s original representation to HDC
representation, there are two main mapping techniques — orthogo-
nal distributed mapping and distance preserving mapping [11].
Considering that there are 28 ⇥ 28 = 784 pixels in an image
in MNIST, we employ orthogonal distributed mapping to encode
the position information of each pixel. Concretely, we assign a
random hypervector to each position (called position hypervector),
which automatically ensures that the 784 position hypervectors
are distinct and quasi-orthogonal to each other due to the hyper-
dimensionality. We store these position hypervectors in a look-up
table, which is referred to as position memory. Fig. 2(a) shows the
normalized Hamming distance between each pair of position hy-
pervectors. We see that the normalized Hamming distance between
any two di￿erent position hypervectors is almost 0.5, implying that
the randomly chosen position hypervectors are quasi-orthogonal
to each other [42].
Next, we map pixel values to hypervectors, which are called
value hypervectors. Clearly, di￿erent pixel values are correlated. To
preserve similarity of pixel values, we adopt the distance preserving
mapping technique and create linearly similar value hypervectors
to represent 256 pixel levels, since each pixel value in the MNIST
dataset is stored as a 8-bit integer. Typically, the value hypervec-
tors associated with the minimum and maximum pixel values are
orthogonal (i.e. there are ⇡2 distinct elements between the two
endpoint value hypervectors). To do so, we initially pick a random
hypervector to represent the minimal pixel value of 0. Then, start-
ing from the initial value hypervector associated with the minimum
pixel value, we generate a new value hypervector for the next pixel
value by randomly ￿ipping ⇡2⇥255 elements of the preceding value
hypervector each time. By doing so, we get 256 value hypervectors,
including two orthogonal value hypervectors that represent the
maximum and minimum pixel values. The 256 value hypervectors
are stored in a value memory. The normalized Hamming distance
between value hypervectors is shown in Fig. 2(b). It can be observed
that the similarity between two value hypervectors is gradually
increasing when their associated pixel values decrease. In fact, the
normalized Hamming distance between each two value hypervec-
tors is proportional to the corresponding pixel value di￿erence.
Note that once the position hypervectors and value hypervectors
are decided and stored in position and value memories, respectively,
they will remain ￿xed and be used throughout the entire training
and testing/inference stages [42, 44].
3.2 HDC Classi￿er
Like in conventional classi￿cation models [36], a HDC classi￿er
also consists of a training stage and a testing/inference stage, as
illustrated in Fig. 3(b).
3.2.1 Training. As illustrated in Fig. 3(a), a key step of the HDC
classi￿er is to map a training sample image to a sample hypervector
using an encoder based on the image’s position/value hypervectors
as well MAP operation. For a sample image in the training dataset,
we generate 784 pixel hypervectors, each representing one of the
784 pixels in the image. Speci￿cally, each pixel hypervector is com-
puted by multiplying the corresponding position hypervector and
value hypervector. Next, we add up all the 784 pixel hypervectors
and binarize the resulting hypervector using the majority rule, thus
generating a sample hypervector that represents the sample image
in a hyperdimensional space.
The ultimate goal of HDC classi￿er training is to generate an
associative memory that contains 10 class hypervectors associated
with 10 labels/classes in the MNIST dataset. To generate a class
hypervector, we encode all the sample images in this class into
the corresponding sample hypervectors, which are then combined
together using the superposition/addition operation. Similarly, the
majority rule is adopted to guarantee the class hypervector to be
binary. Each class hypervector essentially represents the “center”
of all sample hypervectors in that class.
3.2.2 Testing/Inference. For testing or inference, using the same
encoder as the in the training stage, each new image is ￿rst encoded
into a query hypervector that represents the image in the considered
hyperdimensional space. In conventional machine learning [36], the
class whose center is closest to the query in a certain metric space
is returned as the prediction label. The same principal applies in the
context of HDC classi￿ers. Speci￿cally, we compare the similarity of
the query hypervector to each class hypervector in the associative
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memory in terms of the (normalized) Hamming distance. Then, the
HDC classi￿er will return the label of the class hypervector, which
has the minimum Hamming distance to the query hypervector.
4 THREAT MODEL
Our threatmodel largely follows the common attack scenarios in the
context of fooling traditional DNN models [31], while the objective
function in Eqn. (2) is tailored to HDC classi￿ers. Speci￿cally, we
consider an adversary (a.k.a. attacker) who minimally modi￿es
a query image in order to make the HDC classi￿er’s prediction
erroneous.
Attacker’s capability.We focus on a grey-box scenario where
the attacker is prohibited to access and control the detailed parame-
ters (e.g., position memory, value memory, and associative memory)
and the training dataset of the target HDC classi￿er. Nonetheless,
the attacker is allowed to repeatedly send images to the HDC clas-
si￿er and obtain the corresponding prediction labels. The attacker
can add perturbation to the images. In addition, for each image, the
attacker is also able to receive the Hamming distances between the
image’s query hypervector and each class hypervector, which thus
forms our grey-box model. Note that only the Hamming distances,
not the query or class hypervectors, are revealed to the attacker. In
the context of DNN-based image classi￿cation, the softmax prob-
ability for each class in the last layer as well as the prediction
label are typically provided to the user [15]. Thus, our assumption
of the attacker’s knowing the hamming distances (which are the
counterparts of softmax probabilities in DNNs) is not restrictive.
Attacker’s goal.With limited knowledge about the target HDC
classi￿er, the attacker aims to craft an adversarial imagewhich, with
as little perturbation as possible, can mislead the HDC classi￿er to
predict a label other than the true label. This is consistent with non-
targeted attacks in standard adversarial machine learning [32, 33].
Problem formulation. In the MNIST dataset with  = 10
classes, we denote the pixel representation of an input image in
a vector form as - 2 R784. Then, given the target HDC classi￿er,
we use f (- ) = [51 (- ), · · · , 5 (- )] 2 [0, 1] to represent the nor-
malized Hamming distances between the input - ’s hypervector
and the  class hypervectors. Speci￿cally, the HDC classi￿er ￿rst
encodes the input - into a hypervector, then computes the Ham-
ming distances f (- ) = [51 (- ), · · · , 5 (- )] 2 [0, 1] , and ￿nally
decides the prediction class label C- as the one with the minimum
Hamming distance.
Given a benign image - with its true class label C0, the attacker
would like to create an adversarially perturbed image -˜ 2 R784 such
that the predicted label C-˜ = argmin: {f (-˜ )} for -˜ di￿ers from the
true label C0. Formally, we can de￿ne the objective function as
6(-˜ , C0) = max{min
:<C0
[f (-˜ )]   5C0 (-˜ ), n}, (1)
where min:<C0 [f (-˜ )] is the minimum Hamming distance of the
perturbed image to any of the class hypervectors with wrong la-
bels, 5C0 (-˜ ) is the Hamming distance of the perturbed image to
the true class hypervector, and a small constant n > 0 is included
inside “max{· , n}” to indicate that the attacker does not need
to add further perturbation if its attack is already successful (i.e.,
min:<C0 [f (-˜ )]   5C0 (-˜ ) is already less than  n). Thus, by mini-
mizing 6(-˜ , C0), the attacker can e￿ectively increase the Hamming
distance of the perturbed image to the true class hypervector while
decreasing its Hamming distance to other class hypervectors, which
hence misleads the HDC classi￿er to a wrong prediction label.
Meanwhile, the attacker also needs to keep its perturbation to
the original image- as minimum as possible, which can be modeled
by including regularization terms. Concretely, the attacker obtains
-˜ by minimizing the following regularized objective function:
min
-˜
 
6(-˜ , C0) + 2 · k-˜   - k
 
, (2)
where k-˜   - k is a certain norm that quanti￿es the di￿erence
between -˜ and - , and 2   0 adjusts the weight for regularization.
We can also add multiple norms for regularization. For example,
!0 norm controls the number of modi￿ed pixels, !2 norm controls
the squared di￿erence between two images’ pixel values, while !1
controls the maximum di￿erence between two images’ pixel values.
Note that the attacker only knows theHamming distances f (-˜ ) =
[51 (-˜ ), · · · , 5 (-˜ )] and C-˜ = argmin: {f (-˜ )}, but not the func-
tions f (·) = [51 (·), · · · , 5 (·)] themselves that map an input -˜ to
the resulting Hamming distances. As a result, the attacker cannot
directly solve the optimization problem in Eqn. (2).
5 A MODIFIED GENETIC ALGORITHM
In this section, to create an adversarial input without a white-box
HDC classi￿er, we ￿rst describe a basic genetic algorithm and then
propose the modi￿cations we make so as to reduce the amount of
perturbation introduced to the original benign input.
5.1 Genetic Algorithm
Because of the complex Hamming distance function f (·) and 256
possible values for each of the 784 pixels, the optimization problem
in Eqn. (2) involves non-convex integer programming. More im-
portantly, the function f (·) is non-di￿erentiable and unknown to
the attacker. Here, to solve Eqn. (2), we propose a modi￿ed genetic
algorithm, called Genetic Algorithm with Critical Gene Crossover
and Perturbation Adjustment (GA-CGC-PA). Inspired by evolution-
ary theory and natural selection, genetic algorithm is an iterative
search heuristic that has been applied to solve various optimization
problems [37, 38, 45].
Concretely, for adversarial attacks, GA-CGC-PA described in Al-
gorithm 1 takes an original input image as an ancestor, from which
the ￿rst generation of population is generated by natural mutation.
A ￿tness score for each member (i.e., a candidate adversarial image)
is evaluated according to a prede￿ned ￿tness function, which is
also the additive inverse of objective function de￿ned in Eqn. (2).
Thus, for each member, the attacker needs a query from the HDC
classi￿er to evaluate its ￿tness score.
Members with higher ￿tness scores will be selected to breed the
subpopulation, forming the next generation. In each generation,
natural mutation is also considered. By constantly repeating the
evolutionary process, an optimal (possibly locally optimal) individ-
ual is ultimately obtained.
A basic genetic algorithm includes four main steps — popula-
tion initialization, member selection, crossover, and mutation — as
described in detail below.
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Algorithm 1Modi￿ed Genetic Algorithm (GA-CGC-PA)
Input:
Original input - , true label C0, population size # , maximum
iteration  max
Output: adversarial sample -˜
1 Create the initial generation %0 from - .
2 ⌧2DAA  %0
3 for 8C4 = 1 to  max do
4 Compute ￿tness score of each member in ⌧2DAA
5 Find the elite member ⇢;8 in ⌧2DAA
⇢;8 = argmaxG 2⌧2DAA 5 8C=4BB (G)
6 Save ⇢;8 as a member of next generation ⌧=4GC
7 if argmin: (f (⇢;8)) < C0 then
8 -˜  ⇢;8
9 return -˜
10 break
11 endif
12 Compute selection probability %B4; of ⌧2DAA
13 for =D<=2 to N do
14 Choose a pair of parents in ⌧2DAA according to %B4;
15 Apply Critical Gene Crossover (Algorithm 2)
16 Apply clipping and add clipped child to ⌧=4GC
17 endfor
18 ⌧2DAA  ⌧=4GC
19 endfor
20 Apply Perturbation Adjustment (Algorithm 3)
5.1.1 Population Initialization. The ￿rst generation is initialized by
applying uniformly distributed random noise in the allowed range
( f<0G ,f<0G ) to each gene of the ancestor - . For the MNIST
dataset, each gene corresponds to one pixel. In total, there are
28 ⇥ 28 = 784 genes in each individual member, and the algorithm
creates # members in each generation.
5.1.2 Member Selection. The quality of each population member
is evaluated by computing a ￿tness score according to the ￿tness
function (additive inverse of Eqn. 2). Population members with
higher ￿tness scores are more likely to be selected to reproduce the
next generation, whereas members with lower ￿tness scores are
replaced with a higher probability. Towards this end, we compute
the softmax of the ￿tness scores in one generation to obtain the
selection probability distribution of the population. We then ran-
domly choose pairs of parents to breed o￿springs according to the
softmax probability distribution. In order to save the member with
the highest ￿tness score (called elite member) in one generation,
an elitism technique [46] is employed, where the genes of the elite
member are exactly cloned by a member in the next generation.
5.1.3 Crossover. Our algorithm makes use of uniform crossover
to mate two parents. Each gene of an o￿spring is produced by
combining genes of both parents, %0A4=C1 and %0A4=C2, according
to the probability distribution (?, 1  ?). We get ? through dividing
the ￿tness of the ￿rst parent %1 by the sum ￿tness of both parents.
Thus, the child’s genes are given as follows:
2⌘8;3 = ? ⇥ %0A4=C1 + (1   ?) ⇥ %0A4=C2 . (3)
Algorithm 2 Critical Gene Crossover
Input:
%0A4=C1 and %0A4=C2, crossover probability (?, 1   ?) of %0A4=C1
and %0A4=C2 with ? > 1   ? , maximum !1 mutation distance
f<0G , mutation probability d , critical threshold V
Output: 2⌘8;3
1 2⌘8;3  %0A4=C1.
2 Apply 2 ⇥ 2 max pooling to 2⌘8;3
2⌘8;3 0 =<0G?>>;8=6(2⌘8;3)
3 Up-sample 2⌘8;3 0 to the original dimension 28 ⇥ 28 = 784
4 Normalize values of 2⌘8;3 0 to [0, 1]
2⌘8;3 0 = 2⌘8;3
0 <8= (2⌘8;30)
<0G (2⌘8;30)
5 Find indexes of critical genes 83G such that
2⌘8;3 0[83G] > V
6 Update critical genes of 2⌘8;3
2⌘8;3 [83G] = ? ⇥ %0A4=C1 [83G] + (1   ?) ⇥ %0A4=C2 [83G]
7 Mutate 2⌘8;3
2⌘8;3 [83G] = 2⌘8;3 [83G] + ⌫(1, d) ⇥ ` ( f<0G ,f<0G )
8 return 2⌘8;3
Nonetheless, since it is required that the perturbation made to the
original image be kept as minimum as possible, we reduce the
number of perturbed genes (pixels) by using a modi￿ed version
of uniform crossover, which we call critical gene crossover as de-
scribed in Section 5.2.1.
5.1.4 Mutation. In order to promote diversity within a genera-
tion and improve the search power of the genetic algorithm, the
child generated by crossover has to be mutated and clipped be-
fore becoming a member of the next generation. Like population
initialization, random noise is sampled uniformly from a range
( f<0G ,f<0G ) and added to the chromosome of the child with a
mutation probability d . Considering that a feasible solution has to
possess a reasonable gene (e.g. pixel value for MNIST dataset), a
mutated child is clipped to ensure that its genes are all within an
allowable range.
5.2 Modi￿cation for Perturbation Reduction
While the basic genetic algorithm can generate an adversarial im-
age to fool the HDC classi￿er, the amount of perturbation can be
really signi￿cant (see Fig. 4(b) for an example), making the adver-
sarial input more easily identi￿ed by human perception. Here, we
propose to use critical gene crossover and perturbation adjustment
to signi￿cantly reduce the amount of perturbation.
5.2.1 Critical Gene Crossover. While each individual member car-
ries a large number of genes (784 genes each MNIST image), not
all the genes are equally critical to the improvement of ￿tness
score. Additionally, the standard uniform crossover modi￿es each
pixel of the original image, which unnecessarily introduces redun-
dant perturbation. To reduce perturbation, we propose critical gene
crossover to selectively cross the parents’ most important genes.
To do so, we ￿rst make a child by duplicating the parent with the
higher ￿tness score and then select critical genes using the max
pooling operation. Next, we renew the critical genes by uniformly
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Figure 4: Comparison of di￿erent adversarial attacks that mislead the HDC classi￿er to classify “6” as “2”. (a) Original benign
image. (b) Adversarial image by basic genetic algorithm (GA). (c) Adversarial image by genetic algorithm with critical gene
crossover (GA-CGC). (d) Adversarial image by our proposed genetic algorithm with critical gene crossover and perturbation
adjustment (GA-CGC-PA).
(a) (b)
Figure 5: Importance sampling to select critical genes. (a)
The original image of digit “2”, with perturbation possibly
added on 28 ⇥ 28 = 784 pixels (genes). (b) After importance
sampling via 2⇥ 2max pooling, perturbation is restricted to
critical genes (i.e., pixels) with su￿ciently large pixel values.
crossing those of the two parents. The detailed steps are described
in Algorithm 2.
We de￿ne critical genes as the ones that mostly di￿erentiate
images of di￿erent classes. For the example of the MNIST dataset,
pixels that are close to and form the digit are more important than
others that have lower pixel values andmostly form the background,
and hence can be chosen as critical genes. This can be done via
importance sampling [47] and is illustrated in Fig. 5. Concretely,
we run a 2 ⇥ 2 max pooling of the absolute pixel value for each
image, up-sample to the original dimension and normalize all the
values to the range of [0, 1]. Then, we execute Boolean comparison
of all the values to a threshold V and decide the critical genes.
5.2.2 Perturbation Adjustment. Considering the fact that the ge-
netic algorithm generates random mutation in each generation
and thus can introduce unnecessary modi￿cation to the original
image, we propose to further reduce the perturbation by using
perturbation adjustment while still keeping the adversarial attack
Algorithm 3 Perturbation Adjustment
Input:
Original image - , true label C0, adversarial image -˜
1 Find an index list L for pixels that di￿er in - and -˜
2 for ? in L do
3 E>A8  - [?]
4 E03E  -˜ [?]
5 for E = E>A8 to E03E do
6 -˜ [?] = E
7 if argmin: (f (-˜ )) < C0 then
8 break
9 endif
10 endfor
11 endfor
successful. Our perturbation adjustment technique is described in
Algorithm 3. It starts by ￿nding an index list L of modi￿ed pixels
in the adversarial image compared to the original image. For each
pixel in the list L, its value is restored to the original value E>A8 .
Then, we gradually change the value towards the adversarial value
E03E in the adversarial image and stop this process until the adver-
sarial image can successfully mislead the HDC classi￿er to a wrong
prediction.
5.3 E￿ect of Perturbation Reduction
To highlight the e￿ect of our proposed modi￿cation — critical gene
crossover and perturbation adjustment — to the basic genetic algo-
rithm, we present an example of adversarial attacks on the digit “6”
using three di￿erent algorithms in Fig. 4: standard genetic algorithm
without modi￿cation (GA), modi￿ed genetic algorithm with only
critical gene crossover (GA-CGC), and modi￿ed genetic algorithm
with both critical gene crossover and perturbation adjustment (GA-
CGC-PA). The HDC classi￿er is trained on the MNIST dataset as
described in Section 6.1. In all the three attacks, the HDC classi￿er
misclassi￿es the digit “6” as “2”. Fig. 4(a) shows the original benign
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Table 1: Comparison of Three Adversarial Attacks
Attack GA GA-CGC GA-CGF-PA
# Modi￿ed Pixels 438 218 9
!2-distance 3.491 2.245 0.187
!1-distance 0.298 0.296 0.160
image for digit “6” which can be correctly classi￿ed by the HDC
classi￿er, while Fig. 4(b) shows the adversarial image using GA. We
can clearly see that many pixels in the original image are modi￿ed
and added with perturbation noise, making the adversarial image
easily identi￿able. Fig. 4(c) shows the adversarial image generated
by GA-CGC after using critical gene crossover. Compared with the
result in Fig. 4(b), many background pixels in Fig. 4(c) are left un-
changed and only pixels surrounding the digit are altered. By using
GA-CGC-PA with further perturbation adjustment, the adversarial
image is shown in Fig. 4(d), which looks very similar to the origi-
nal benign image but is still misclassi￿ed by the HDC classi￿er as
“2”. This shows the clear advantage of GA-CGC-PA over the basic
genetic algorithm and only using critical gene crossover, in terms
of reducing the amount of perturbation in adversarial images.
Further, we provide in Table 1 a quantitative comparison of
perturbation introduced by the three algorithms in terms of the
!? norm metric. From the result, we see that the number of pixels
modi￿ed (i.e., !0 norm) is largely reduced from 438 to 9 by using
GA-CGC-PA. In addition, with GA-CGC-PA, the !2 and !1 norms
of the perturbation also decrease signi￿cantly compared to the basic
GA and GA-CGC.
6 EVALUATION RESULTS
This section validates the e￿ectiveness of our proposed GA-CGC-
PA for adversarial attacks on a target HDC classi￿er. We focus on
the MNIST dataset and train a HDC classi￿er based on the design
in Section 3. Then, we show that: with a random majority rule,
GA-CGC-PA can signi￿cantly reduce the classi￿cation accuracy
for all test images; and with a ￿xed majority rule, GA-CGC-PA can
successfully make the HDC classi￿er misclassify 78% of the other-
wise correctly-classi￿ed benign images. Importantly, our results are
the ￿rst to highlight that the emerging HDC classi￿cation models
are vulnerable to adversarial attacks.
6.1 HDC Classi￿er Training
We train a HDC classi￿er based on the MNIST training dataset [35],
while noting that it is an active research topic in the ￿eld to design
HDC classi￿ers for more sophisticated datasets like ImageNet [11,
19]. We create 784 position hypervectors to represent 28 ⇥ 28 =
784 pixel positions and 256 value hypervectors to represent pixel
values. The dimensionality for each hypervector is ⇡ = 104. Then,
as described in Section 3, we encode each training sample into
a sample hypervector and obtain 10 class hypervectors based on
the training dataset. Next, we project each test image into a query
hypervector and compare it against class hypervectors. Recalling
that in the hypervector encoding process, we use the majority
rule for vector binarization. By using the random majority rule
(RMR) that randomly assigns 1 or  1 in the rare event that the
sum is zero after superposition operation, the HDC classi￿er may
assign di￿erent labels in di￿erent inferences for the same input.
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Figure 6: Probability mass function (PMF) of per-image ac-
curacy on the HDC classi￿er with RMR.
To eliminate this uncertainty, we can also apply the ￿xed majority
rule (FMR) that always assigns 1 or  1.
For the HDC classi￿er with RMR, we execute 1,000 rounds of
classi￿cation for each test image to calculate the average accuracy,
which we also refer to as per-image accuracy. Fig. 6 shows the dis-
tribution of per-image accuracy for the test dataset. We see that,
for around 70% of the test images, the HDC classi￿er can assign
correct labels with 100% per-image accuracy. Meanwhile, there are
about 15% test images that are almost always misclassi￿ed. For the
remaining 15% test images, the HDC classi￿er behaves uncon￿-
dently and sometimes yields misclassi￿ed results. Consequently,
the test images that have 100% per-image accuracy are harder to
attack (called hard cases) than those with a lower per-image ac-
curacy (called vulnerable case). In other words, vulnerable images
can be considered already “adversarial” to our HDC classi￿er to
some extent, although they are from the MNIST dataset. The overall
accuracy of our HDC classi￿er is lower than that of DNNs [15],
and can be improved by enlarging the MNIST dataset, which is
beyond the scope of our work. Importantly, as we will show later,
GA-CGC-PA can successfully mislead the HDC classi￿er with a
high probability regardless of hard or vulnerable cases.
6.2 Attack on HDC Classi￿er with RMR
We ￿rst evaluate GA-CGC-PA by considering the random majority
rule (RMR) for the HDC classi￿er. In our algorithm, we use popu-
lation size # = 6, mutation probability d = 0.05, max pooling size
2⇥2, and critical threshold V = 0.
We focus on attacking the hard cases (i.e., those images with
100% per-image accuracy), while noting that the already-vulnerable
images (i.e., those with less than 100% per-image accuracy) are even
easier to attack. Fig. 7 visually illustrates the benign input images,
adversarial perturbation noise, and the corresponding adversarial
images. The adversarial images can signi￿cantly decrease the HDC
classi￿er’s performance, while they are still clearly recognizable
by human eyes. Moreover, because of the critical gene crossover,
adversarial perturbation noises are mostly added around the digit
pixels rather than spread throughout the whole image.
Fig. 8 shows the evolution of ￿tness scores for attacking the
benign images of digits “0” and “1” (in Fig. 7) when using GA-
CGC-PA. Each iteration produces a new population generation
(i.e., a set of 6 candidate adversarial images). We can see that GA-
CGC-PA gradually increases the ￿tness score (which is the additive
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Figure 7: Adversarial attacks on the HDC classi￿er with RMR. The ￿rst row shows the original benign images. The second
row shows the perturbation noise added by the attacker. The third row shows the adversarial images, and the corresponding
misclassi￿ed labels are given at the top of each image.
Table 2: Perturbation for Images Shown in Fig. 7
Digit 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
#Modi￿ed Pixels 289 160 260 196 185 241 177 192 256 253
!2-distance 4.626 5.073 3.02 3.703 1.37 3.028 2.58 4.017 2.029 1.537
!1-distance 0.867 0.968 0.643 0.956 0.276 0.653 0.737 0.92 0.401 0.271
(a) Digit “0” (b) Digit “1”
Figure 8: Fitness score for digits “0” and “1” in Fig. 7. Given a
population size # = 6 in each generation in GA-CGC-PA, the
attacker needs 6 queries in each iteration.
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Figure 9: Per-image accuracies of benign images and corre-
sponding adversarial images shown in Fig. 7.
inverse of our objective function in Eqn. 2), thus iteratively updating
adversarial images.
Next, we show the corresponding per-image accuracies of both
original images and adversarial ones in Fig. 9. It can be clearly seen
that, with GA-CGC-PA, all the images become vulnerable with a
per-accuracy lower than 100%. In particular, the sample images for
digits “0” and “8” in Fig. 7 have the lowest accuracy after attacks
and hence are relatively easier to attack than others.
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Figure 10: Query counts needed to generate adversarial im-
ages shown in Fig. 7.
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Figure 11: ASR of digits 0-9 for HDC classi￿er with FMR.
6.2.1 Amount of Perturbation. Next, we quantify the adversarial
perturbation noise generated and added to the benign images. To
have a successful attack, the adversarial images need to not only
deceive the HDC classi￿er but also have as small perturbation as
possible compared to benign ones. To this end, the amount of per-
turbation is an important metric to evaluate the attack algorithm.
As in the prior studies on adversarial machine learning [33], we
use !0 norm, !2 norm, and !1 norms to measure the amount of
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Figure 12: Box plot of perturbation noise added by GA-CGC-PA for the HDC classi￿er with FMR. Each box plot shows the
values for the maximum/minimum/median/75th percentile/25th percentile, excluding outliers.
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Figure 13: Box plot of query count needed byGA-CGC-PA for
theHDC classi￿erwith FMR. Each box plot shows the values
for the maximum/minimum/median/75th percentile/25th
percentile, excluding outliers.
perturbation. Note that while !0 is not a mathematical norm, it is
commonly used to quantify the total number of modi￿ed pixels in
our context. By de￿nition, !2 norm indicates the overall perturba-
tion noise added to a benign image, while !1 norm measures the
maximum per-pixel perturbation noise.
Table 2 shows the three norm distances for the perturbation noise
added to the benign images shown in Fig. 7. It is worth noting that
!2 and !1 norms are calculated over the images with normalized
pixel values in the range of [0, 1]. For all the adversarial images
shown in Fig. 7, there are fewer than 300 modi￿ed pixels. While
the !1 is large, the !2 norm is reasonably small for most digits,
indicating the overall perturbation added by GA-CGC-PA is not
large, which can also be observed from Fig. 7.
6.2.2 ￿ery Count. In addition, query e￿ciency is also an im-
portant metric to evaluate a black-box or grey-box attack, since
access to the target classi￿er may be limited. From the attacker’s
perspective, fewer queries are desired in order to hide its identity
and stealthiness for attacks. Thus, we plot in Fig. 10 the number of
queries used to generate the adversarial images.
The result shows that the average query count is up to the order
of thousands. In particular, the query count for digit “2” is more
than 7k, whereas the digit “4” needs the least number of queries
to attack. While the existing adversarial attacks in the literature
focus on DNN-based classi￿ers and di￿erent datasets, we note that
they typically need an order of 10k or more queries to successfully
attack an image [37, 38].
6.3 Attack on HDC Classi￿er with FMR
We now turn to the ￿xed majority rule (FMR) such that the pre-
diction label for a given image is ￿xed without uncertainties. The
hyperparameters for GA-CGC-PA are the same as in Section 6.2.
6.3.1 A￿ack Success Rate. With FMR, the per-image accuracy is
either 0 or 1. Thus, instead of considering an individual image, we
demonstrate the attack success rate (ASR) ofGA-CGC-PA over mul-
tiple images. Speci￿cally, we randomly pick 200 correctly classi￿ed
images for each digit from “0” to “9” from the MNIST dataset. For
each image, we apply GA-CGC-PA to generate the corresponding
adversarial image subject to a maximum query count of 105 (i.e.,
 max = 105 in Algorithm 1). If an adversarial image is successfully
generated to fool the HDC classi￿er within the query limit, it is
regarded as a successful attack, and a failed attack otherwise.
We compute the ASR over 200 images for each digit and present
the results in Fig. 11. It can be seen that GA-CGC-PA is successful
for all the digits in most cases, with digits “3”, “5”, “8” and “9” having
the highest ASR. Considering the 10 digits altogether, we obtain an
average ASR of 0.78.
6.3.2 Amount of Perturbation. To show the amount of adversarial
perturbation added by GA-CGC-PA, we provide the bar plot of
perturbation amount in terms of !0, !2 and !1 norms in Fig. 12.
As one can see from the ￿gure, the median number of modi￿ed
pixels for most adversarial images is around 100. The !2 norm for
the majority of perturbation noise is between 2 and 4, whereas the
!1 norm lies mostly between 0.3 and 0.8 for most images.
6.3.3 ￿ery Count. Next, we calculate the query counts for the
successfully attacked images and show the results in a box plot
in Fig. 13. We can notice that the median query count of all digits
is less than 5,000, which is a reasonably good query e￿ciency for
black-/grey-box attacks [37].
6.3.4 Adversarial Examples. Finally, we visually show some adver-
sarial examples for the HDC classi￿er with FMR, and provide the
corresponding amount of perturbation noises. We choose two sets
of examples: hard case and vulnerable case. In the hard case, benign
images would have a 100% per-image accuracy had the HDC classi-
￿er use RMR. In the vulnerable case, benign images are correctly
classi￿ed by the HDC classi￿er with FMR, but would have less than
100% per-image accuracy had the classi￿er use RMR. That is, the
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Figure 14: Adversarial attacks on the HDC classi￿er with FMR (hard case). The ￿rst row shows the original benign images.
The second row shows the perturbation noise added by the attacker. The third row shows the adversarial images, and the
corresponding misclassi￿ed labels are given at the top of each image.
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Figure 15: Adversarial attacks on the HDC classi￿er with FMR (vulnerable case). The ￿rst row shows the original benign
images. The second row shows the perturbation noise added by the attacker. The third row shows the adversarial images, and
the corresponding misclassi￿ed labels are given at the top of each image.
Table 3: Perturbation for Images Shown in Fig. 14 and Fig. 15. The values for Fig. 15 are shown in parentheses.
Digit 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
#Modi￿ed Pixels 301 (22) 123 (82) 95 (21) 104 (107) 72 (42) 117 (34) 113 (9) 74 (86) 114 (68) 97 (45)
!2-distance 6.73 (0.36) 4.48 (0.95) 2.20 (0.45) 0.82 (0.65) 1.54 (0.44) 0.69 (0.66) 0.76 (0.18) 1.90 (1.12) 0.64 (0.73) 0.72 (0.49)
!1-distance 0.92 (0.21) 0.96 (0.24) 0.69 (0.21) 0.21 (0.15) 0.53 (0.13) 0.19 (0.21) 0.23 (0.16) 0.56 (0.37) 0.18 (0.25) 0.20 (0.19)
vulnerable images are those borderline images that are already hard
to correctly classify by the HDC classi￿er.
The benign images, perturbation noise, and adversarial images
for hard and vulnerable cases are shown in Fig. 14 and Fig. 15,
respectively. Also, we give the amount of perturbation noises for
the two cases in Table 3.
It is more di￿cult to launch successful attacks in the hard case
than in the vulnerable case. Thus, as expected, the perturbation
noise added by GA-CGC-PA in the hard case is generally less than
in the vulnerable case. In particular, in the vulnerable case, the
adversarial image is almost identical to the corresponding benign
image by human perception. This can also be re￿ected from the
perturbation noise ￿gures and Table 3.
7 DEFENSE STRATEGIES
We highlight two simple defense strategies — adversarial training
(also commonly used for defending DNNs) and retraining (relevant
to ensemble learning) — to degrade the attack success rate (ASR).
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7.1 Adversarial Training
Adversarial training is a common and proven defense approach to
increasing the robustness of classi￿cation models, especially for
the recently exploding DNN-based classi￿ers [33, 48, 49]. The key
idea is to strengthen the classi￿er by augmenting training data with
adversarial samples throughout the training process. Similarly, this
strategy can be also applied in defending HDC classi￿ers.
To evaluate the e￿ect of adversarial training in defending HDC
classi￿ers, we ￿rst generate 2,000 adversarial samples, 200 for each
digit, based on the HDC classi￿er with FMR. Combining the ad-
versarial samples with the original training dataset, we retrain the
HDC classi￿er with the same set of position hypervectors and value
hypervectors as before, and obtain the corresponding associative
memory containing 10 class hypervectors. Next, we use the 2,000
adversarial samples to attack the new HDC classi￿er and get the
ASR shown in Fig. 16. Note that unlike the ASR in Section 6.3, we
focus on whether the new HDC classi￿er still misclassify the adver-
sarial samples that are misclassi￿ed by the original classi￿er. Thus,
we compute the ASR by dividing the number of still misclassi￿ed
samples by the total number of adversarial 2,000 samples misclas-
si￿ed by the original HDC classi￿er. As a result, the ASR for the
original HDC classi￿er is considered as 1. We can see that ASR to
the HDC classi￿er with adversarial training decreases signi￿cantly
to around 0.5, which means that only half of the adversarial samples
can still mislead the HDC classi￿er. While the attacker can further
modify adversarial samples to possibly fool the new HDC classi-
￿er again, adversarial training clearly are e￿ective against some
adversarial images and hence increases the di￿culty of successful
attacks.
A potential drawback of adversarial training is that many adver-
sarial samples need to be generated and included into the training
dataset, which might degrade the classi￿cation accuracy for benign
images as shown in DNN-based classi￿ers [15, 31, 37].
7.2 Retraining
Random indexing (Section 2.1) is a unique feature in HDC classi￿ers.
By random indexing, di￿erent position hypervectors and value
hypervectors are generated, resulting in di￿erent class hypervectors
(i.e., di￿erent HDC classi￿ers) even with the same training dataset.
Note that the randomly generated position hypervectors and value
hypervectors are ￿xed for a given HDC classi￿er. This is similar to
ensemble learning [15, 36] where multiple models are trained by
using di￿erent hyperparameters, but random indexing can create a
lot more randomness due to its hyperdimensional space [13] than
varying the hyperparameters in traditional machine learning.
The adversarial samples crated by GA-CGC-PA are targeted at
a ￿xed (but unknown to the attacker) set of position hypervectors,
memory hypervectors and the trained class hypervectors. Due to
the large randomness in these hypervectors, adversarial samples
are not expected to transfer well between di￿erent HDC classi￿ers
even though they are trained on the same training dataset. We still
use the 2,000 adversarial samples for evaluation. Using the same
training dataset but a new random indexing, we can train a new
HDC classi￿er. As illustrated in Fig. 16, the ASR for these 2,000
adversarial samples now decreases to less than 0.1, which clearly
increases the di￿culty to fool the HDC classi￿er.
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Figure 16: ASR for the original HDC classi￿er, and newHDC
classi￿ers with adversarial training and retraining defenses.
Moreover, based on the idea of moving target defense [50], the
defender can trainmultiple HDC classi￿ers (by usingmultiple di￿er-
ent position hypervectors and value hypervectors) and randomize
the choice of classi￿ers for each query image. This can further
strengthen the security of HDC classi￿ers, although the storage
complexity for inference also increases.
Given constraints such as inference accuracy and complexity,
the defender can select an appropriate defense strategy for its HDC
classi￿er. While there can be more advanced defense mechanisms
(e.g., detecting adversarial inputs [51]) which we leave as a future
research direction, our study is important in that it is the ￿rst to
demonstrate the vulnerability of emerging HDC classi￿ers and
highlight the urgency of security awareness.
8 RELATEDWORKS
Adversarial machine learning has been extensively studied in re-
cent years [30, 31, 33, 52, 53]. Adversarial samples can be fed to
a target machine learning model during either training or test-
ing/inference stages to degrade the model performance [33, 54].
Here, we consider creating adversarial samples during the inference
stage. While early studies focus on generating adversarial images,
recent adversarial machine learning has also been extended to ad-
versarial audio signals [29], adversarial texts [55], fooling LiDAR
sensors in autonomous driving [56], among others.
In general, adversarial attacks on DNNs can be categorized into
white-box attacks, black-box attacks, and grey-box attacks [33]. In
a white-box attack, an attacker is assumed to know complete details
about the target DNNs [52, 53], which is often too strong in practice.
By contrast, in a black-box attack, only benign inputs and the
corresponding prediction label (plus some additional information
such as softmax probabilities in a grey-box setting) are available
to the attacker [38, 57]. For black-box or grey-box attacks, one
approach is to obtain a substitute model for the target DNN and
then generate adversarial samples o￿ine [57, 58]. Nonetheless, this
approach is that it often requires a prohibitively large number of
queries to train a substitute DNN model [59–61].
More recent studies on black-box or grey-box attacks have pro-
posed to use gradient estimations to generate adversarial samples
[47, 62]. Nonetheless, these approaches are generally limited to
di￿erentiable objective functions, which is not the case in HDC
classi￿ers that use Multiply-Add-Permute operation in a hyperdi-
mensional space without di￿erentiable objective functions.
Boundary attack is a gradient-free black-box attack, which cre-
ates adversarial samples using an already-available adversarial sam-
ple as a reference [63, 64]. Nonetheless, an adversarial sample is
12
Adversarial A￿acks on Brain-Inspired Hyperdimensional Computing-Based Classifiers Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA
needed at the ￿rst place. Genetic algorithm is another e￿ective
approach to attacks on DNNs [37, 38, 65]. We leverage a genetic
algorithm, but also extend it with critical gene crossover and per-
turbation adjustment to reduce perturbation (see Fig. 4).
Most importantly, we focus on the emerging HDC classi￿ers
that operate on hypervectors and have recently shown promise
in increasingly more applications, including image classi￿cation
[11, 24], seizure onset detection [27], fault isolation in industrial
systems [26], and robot navigation [28].
The existing studies on HDC classi￿ers have been predomi-
nantly focused on improving the energy e￿ciency, inference la-
tency, privacy preservation, or architecture design [14, 16–21, 34,
66]. Nonetheless, adversarial attacks on HDC classi￿ers have been
neglected, raising serious concerns with their safety as they are
being adopted in increasing more applications including mission-
critical scenarios [11, 26–28]. Our study bridges the gap and demon-
strates that, like their DNN counterparts, HDC classi￿ers can be
vulnerable to adversarial inputs and hence need to be better safe-
guarded.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study adversarial attacks on emerging HDC classi-
￿ers. We ￿rst build a HDC classi￿er for image classi￿cation on the
MNIST dataset, and formulate a regularized optimization problem
for grey-box attacks, where the attacker’s goal is to generate ad-
versarial images for misclassi￿cation. Then, we propose a modi￿ed
genetic algorithm (GA-CGC-PA) to generate adversarial images
within a reasonably small number of queries. Our results show
that GA-CGC-PA can successfully mislead the HDC classi￿er to
wrong prediction labels with a large probability. Finally, we present
two defense strategies — adversarial training and retraining — to
safeguard HDC classi￿ers.
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